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Annex:  Members of  the Working Group on EU Payment Systems 1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.  In November 1993 the Committee of Governors released a report submitted by the Working Group on 
EC Payment Systems on "Minimum common features for domestic payment systems" (the ''November 
1993  Report").  This report concluded with ten principles for EU Interbank Funds Transfer Systems 
(IFTS), covering the six areas identified by central banks as requiring specification in terms of  minimum 
common  features:  access  conditions,  risk  management  policies,  legal  issues,  standards  and 
infrastructures, pricing policies  and business  hours.  The Committee of Governors  also  agreed that 
progress made in implementing the ten principles should be evaluated once a year by EU central banks 
in an annual report to the Governors (now to the EMI Council). This is the first of  these reports. 
2.  The present Report was prepared by the EMI on the basis of information provided by the twelve EU 
central banks which committed themselves to the implementation of  the principles in 1993 and by the 
central banks of  the three new Member States (Austria, Sweden and Finland), who have now agreed to 
commit themselves to the implementation of  the ten principles. 
2.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
3.  The Working Group concluded that, at present, the EU IFTS do not yet fully comply with the minimum 
principles contained in the November 1993 Report, even if  most ofthese principles are at least partially 
satisfied. Nevertheless, work is underway in all EU Member States and considerable progress has been 
made in order to ensure full compliance with them. 
At the domestic level 
4.  The implementation of  Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) systems in all EU countries continues to be 
seen by EU central banks and the EMI as the main priority. Since these RTGS systems are intended to 
form the basis of the payment arrangements which EU central banks and the EMI are proposing to 
implement in view of  Stage III, all RTGS systems should, ideally, be ready for the first possible date of 
Monetary Union. 
5.  Moreover, in accordance with the objective to minimise systemic risks, it is essential that the principles 
set out in the 1990 Re.port of  the Committee on Interbank Netting Schemes of  the central banks of  the 
Group ofTen countries are applied without unnecessary delays to all large-value net settlement systems. 
6.  The implementation ofRTGS systems and the adoption (where required) of  risk control measures in net 
settlement systems will also require considerable resources from commercial banks. Regular contacts 
between central banks and their banking communities have been established in order to minimise the 
costs associated with these measures and to facilitate their timely implementation. -2-
7.  Further work is also required to avoid inconsistencies between domestic legal systems which increase 
risks  in domestic  payment  systems.  Whenever  necessary,  EU  central  banks  will  continue  to work 
towards the elimination of the zero-hour clauses, at least as  far as they affect payment systems.  The 
need  for  other  legal  changes  to  strengthen the  legal  basis  of cross-border  payments  is  now  being 
analysed in many EU countries. 
At the EU level 
8.  The EMI and the Working Group on EU Payment Systems will deepen their analysis concerning remote 
access1 to interbank funds transfer systems in the EU. 
9.  EU central banks will endeavour to define  a common methodology to calculate costs related to their 
payment systems activities, with a view to facilitating the implementation of pricing policies based on 
the principle of  full cost recovery. 
10.  According to Article  109f of the Treaty on European Union,  the EMI  is  entrusted with the task of 
promoting the efficiency of cross-border payments in view of Stage III. In this context, the EU central 
banks and the EMI will continue their work which aims at the creation of an integrated funds transfer 
system, based on linkages between national RTGS  systems (as described in the note published by the 
EMI on  15th November  1994, "The EMI's intentions with regard to cross-border payments in Stage 
III"). 
11.  In  the context of  Article 109f of  the EU Treaty, the EMI will also endeavour to obtain more information 
on the efforts currently being made by the banks to implement technical infrastructures for processing 
retail  cross-border  payments.  However,  no  collective  operational  involvement  is  envisaged  by EU 
central banks in this field.  The EMI will also continue to follow the work of  the European Committee 
for Banking Standards and will encourage banks to avoid the proliferation of  non-compatible standards 
for cross-border payments. 
A credit institution has remote access to an interbank funds transfer system (IFTS) if its main office or one of its 
branches has direct access to an IFTS located in a country other than that in which the main office or the branch is 
located. - 3-
3.  ANALYSIS 
1.  The  assessment  of the  domestic  funds  transfer  systems  in  the  light  of the  ten  principles  of the 
November 1993  Report was conducted by the EMI on the basis of a questionnaire sent to EU central 
banks. As in the November 1993  Report, the analysis conducted primarily concerns some of the main 
features  of the large-value interbank funds  transfer systems  (IFTS),  which are the core  elements  of 
payment systems, but does not disregard retail systems. 
2.  In very general terms, most of  the principles are partially satisfied in all EU countries and work is in 
progress, where necessary, to improve compliance with them. Yet all EU IFTS comply fully with only 
one  of the  principles  laid  down  in  the  November  1993  Report,  which  concerns  operating  hours 
(principle 1  0). Indeed, this principle entailed no specific commitment on the part of  central banks since a 
minimum overlap between the operating hours of  the major EU IFTS already existed when principle 10 
was formulated. 
3.  Principle 1: Direct access to interbank funds transfer systems. As a rule, only central banks and 
credit institutions, as defined under the Second Banking Co-ordination Directive, can be admitted 
as  direct  participants  in  funds  transfer  systems  which  process  third-party  payments.  As 
exceptions, certain other bodies authorised to hold accounts for customers may also be, with the 
approval of the central bank, direct participants in such systems provided that: (a) their public 
nature ensures little risk of failure or (b) they are supervised by a recognised competent authority. 
4.  Banks  and  non-banks.  In  some  countries,  only  credit  institutions  and  the  central  bank  are  direct 
participants in domestic IFTS. In others, some public authorities such as the postal administration are 
also admitted as direct participants. In six countries, some non-bank financial institutions which comply 
with principle  1 are also direct participants in domestic IFTS.  Most are securities dealers.  As  a rule, 
non-bank  participants  in domestic  IFTS  do  not enjoy the  same  treatment  as  credit  institutions.  In 
particular, they do  not have  access  to central bank liquidity.  Finally,  direct  access to IFTS  is  still 
permitted to non-bank institutions  not complying  with principle  1 in only two  countries.  However, 
policies  have  been  adopted  with  a  view  to  gradually  ending  the  participation  of non  supervised 
institutions and this principle will be fully met by 1996. 
5.  Access to central bank accounts.  In some EU countries, some non-banks may have indirect access to 
IFTS through accounts held at their central banks. They are not considered as direct participants in the 
IFTS even if  the central bank runs the system because:  1) the functioning rules of  their accounts differ 
from those of  commercial banks; and 2) they are not allowed to process third-party payments. 
6.  Eligible banks.  In principle, all credit institutions are entitled to have direct access to domestic  IFTS 
provided that they meet the participation criteria of  the systems. However, there exist some IFTSs which 
are  open  only  to  a  specific  category  of banks  (e.g.  funds  transfer  systems  of the  savings  and -4-
co-operative banks).  In  some countries,  savings  and co-operative banks are not allowed to be direct 
participants in the IFTSs and resort to clearing banks that they own to get indirect access to the IFTS. 
7.  Number of direct participants.  The number of direct participants  in  EU  IFTS  differs  widely  from 
country to country, ranging from nine direct participants in the Finnish banks clearing system to 5,817 
in the German EIL-ZV. In general, the number of  participants in EU IFTS has increased slightly during 
the past year as a consequence of an increase in the number of branches of foreign banks participating 
in the systems. 
8.  Principle  2:  No  discrimination  in  access.  No  discrimination  can  be  made  between  home-based 
credit institutions and credit institutions licensed in other EC countries which ask to participate in 
local  interbank funds  transfer  systems,  either  through  their  local  branches  or directly  from 
another Member State. The applicants, however, may be required to establish that they can meet 
the relevant legal provisions of the host country. They  also  have to comply with the necessary 
technical requirements of the system; these requirements, however, should not be discriminatory. 
9.  Compliance with the principle. This principle is complied with only partially. While, no discrimination 
is made between home-based credit institutions and local branches of  credit institutions licensed in other 
EU countries (see Table 1), the implementation of  remote participation2 raises several issues. 
10.  Participation through foreign branches. At present, there are 162 branches of foreign banks which are 
direct participants in EU IFTS, including 104 branches of  banks of  other EU countries, and 55 branches 
ofnon-EU banks. Local branches of  foreign banks are direct participants in at least one IFTS in all EU 
countries, except for Luxembourg.  Systems which are most open to foreign branches are the Spanish 
STMD (fifty-eight out oftwo hundred and nineteen) and the Greek ACO (twelve out of  forty-eight) (see 
Table 1). 
2  A credit institution has remote access to an interbank funds transfer system (IFTS) if  its main office or one of its 
branches has direct access to an IFTS located in a country other than that where the main office or the branch is 
located. - 5-
Direct participants in EU RTGS systems 
DK  D  F  I  NL  s 
DN- EIL-ZV  TBF  BISS  FA  RIX 
Inquiry  (forecast) (BI-REL)  System 
Direct participants  108  5,8173  217  409  169  21 
of  which: 
Credit institutions  85  5,817  170  409  104  16 
-branches of  other EUbanks  3  na  na  10  14  3 
-branches of  non-EC banks  0  na  na  8  11  0 
- remote participants  0  na  na  0  0  0 
Non-banks (meeting principle 1)  23  0  34  0  65  4 
- Public authorities  3  0  1 +CB  0  lO+CB  l+CB 
- Postal Administration  0  0  1  0  0  0 
- Supervised financial institutions  20  0  31  0  15  2 
Direct participants in EU large-value net settlement systems4 
B  D  GR  E  F  IE  I  L  PG 
CH  EAF ACO  Madrid  Stmd  Sagit- DIS  SIPS  ME  LC  Manual  CH 
CH  taire  Netting 
Direct participants  71  60  48  54  219  62  30  119  299  276  13  39 
of which: 
Credit institutions  68  60  46  54  189  61  29  119  298  273  12  38 
- branches of  other EU banks  7  6  12  5  27  2  5  12  12  5  0  4 
-branches of  non-EU banks  3  4  8  2  31  4  0  7  8  4  0  0 
- remote participants  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Non-banks (meeting principle 1)  3  0  2  0  30  1  1  0  1  3  1  1 
- Public authorities  2  0  0  0  0  CB  CB  0  CB  2  0  1 
- Postal Administration  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  0 
- Supervised financial institutions  0  0  1  0  30  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Nwnber of  accounts of  credit institutions at the Deutsche Bundesbank.  3 
4  DIS (Ireland), STMD (Spain) and Banks' clearing (Finland) are end-of-day gross settlement systems. 
Table l.A 
FIN 
BOF 
System 
22 
15 
3 
1 
0 
7 
2+CB 
0 
4 
Table 1.8 
UK  FIN 
CHAPS  Banks 
Clearing 
16  9 
15  9 
2  2 
1  0 
0  0 
1  0 
CB  0 
0  0 
0  0 -6-
Table l.C 
Direct participants in other EU IFTS 
B  DK  D  E  F  IE  I  0  UK 
DN  Cheque 
CEC  Retail  MAO BE  DTA  SNCE  Paris  SIT  Retail  Retail  EBK  BACS  and 
System  CH  Syst~  System  Credit 
Direct  participants  84  60  5,8175  5,817  30  38  23  15  153  90  19  12 
of which 
Credit institutions  81  60  5,817  5,817  30  34  22  14  153  90  18  11 
-branches of other EUbanks  7  na  na  na  0  0  0  4  1  0  0  0 
-branches of non-EU banks  3  na  na  na  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0 
- remote participants  0  na  na  na  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Non-banks (meeting principle 1)  3  0  0  0  0  4  1  1  0  0  1  1 
- Public authorities  2  0  0  0  0  3  1  CB  0  0  CB  CB 
-Postal Administration  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
- Supervised financial institutions  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
11.  Remote access.  When the November 1993 Report was written, it was expected that remote access was 
not likely to develop  rapidly since,  on the one hand, larger credit institutions already have access to 
many  EU  funds  transfer  systems  through  local  branches  and,  on the  other  hand,  smaller  credit 
institutions will probably consider that the additional costs related to such participation would exceed 
the advantages that they could reasonably expect. The situation is now evolving and some EU central 
banks have been informally contacted about remote access by foreign banks. The issue of  remote access 
is now under consideration by the EMI and EU central banks. Although EU central banks accept, in 
principle, that access criteria may not discriminate against applicants from other Member States, neither 
the provisions of the Second Banking Co-ordination Directive, nor principle 2 of the November 1993 
Report, state that banks have an automatic right to remote access. In fact, certain technical, legal and 
prudential issues could make remote participation difficult.  Some EU central banks have already been 
working to remove these obstacles, but it may be the case that a common policy in the EU is necessary 
in order to avoid divergences which could distort competition between financial institutions. Aspects to 
be considered for minimum harmonisation are those relating to the legal framework as well as monetary 
policy and prudential issues,  such as  exchange  of information,  provision of central  bank liquidity, 
collateral pledging and remote participation in domestic interbank money markets. 
Technical  problems.  So  far,  the  following  types  of technical  problems  have  been  identified:  (i) 
telecommunication networks  and standards;  (ii)  manual and back-up procedures and (iii)  bank code 
numbers. 
(i)  In some countries, data relating to all the automated gross and net settlement systems are conveyed 
through the national network, to which potential remote participants would have to be connected. 
5  Number of accom1ts of credit institutions at the Deutsche Bm1desbank. -7-
(ii)  There may be practical problems that make  a local presence difficult to avoid; this  is  perhaps most 
obvious  in  payment  systems  where  a  physical  exchange  of instruments  takes  place  (e.g.  cheque 
clearing), but it may also apply in electronic systems if  one of  the contingency methods in the event of  a 
system failure is to revert to a paper-based or magnetic-tape exchange of  information. 
(iii)  In most EU countries, each participant must have a bank code number in order to be "recognised" by 
the  systems.  In  some  countries  the  number  of available  code  numbers  would  be  too  small  to 
accommodate many remote participants. 
Legal difficulties.  Legal difficulties may stem from some peculiarities of domestic IFTS internal rules 
and statutes as well as from domestic legislation. 
First, internal rules and/or statutes in the domestic IFTS may, at present, be incompatible with remote 
access. Second, some central banks are reluctant to accept remote access by foreign banks because of 
the  legal  uncertainties  in the  applicant's  home  country.  For  instance,  there  is  a  legal  risk that the 
insolvency legislation on the home  country of a cross-border participant may:  (i)  render invalid the 
settlement of payments in both an RTGS  and a net settlement system (because of,  for instance, zero-
hour rules and non-availability of multilateral set-off); (ii) undermine collateral (by privileging claims 
for taxes, wages, statutory mortgages, ..... ); (iii) preclude the termination of  loans. 
Monetary and prudential concerns. Having a settlement account with overdraft facility at the central 
bank is  a condition for  direct membership  in most of the EU  IFTS.  In almost all  EU countries the 
provision of liquidity and the function  of lender of last resort have up  to now been conceived with 
respect  to  banks  established  in  the  country  and,  therefore,  subject to the  national  monetary  and 
prudential regulations.  Some problems may be caused by the fact that remote participants do not fall 
under these regulations. 
12.  Remote access to an account at a central bank. In some cases, holding an account at a specific branch 
of the central bank is  a prerequisite for  access to some  form  of payment system.  However,  existing 
regulations often require that correspondent accounts held at the central bank are maintained only at the 
main office  and not at its  local  branches.  Nevertheless,  in  1994 two  central banks  agreed to open 
sub-accounts at their branches located near the borders, to allow foreign banks to effect cash operations. 
13.  Principle 3: Transparency of access criteria. Access  criteria to interbank funds transfer systems 
should  be laid  down in  a  public  document.  This  document should  also  set out procedures for 
removing a participant from the system. Additional criteria beyond those embodied in principles 1 
and 2 may apply to direct participants. These criteria may include one or more of the following 
conditions: 
•  adequate financial strength of the institution; 
•  minimum number of transactions; 
•  the payment of an entry fee; 
•  the approval (on technical or creditworthiness grounds) of either the owner/manager of the 
system or the direct participants; - 8-
•  the approval of the local central bank (when possible within the legal context of the country). 
14.  Compliance with the principle. Written rules are set out in a public document in all EU countries (see 
Table 2). The criteria adopted in the various systems differ from country to country. 
Table l.A 
Access criteria in EU RTGS systems 
DK  D  F  I  NL  s  FIN 
DN- EIL-ZV  TBF  BISS  FA  RIX  BOF 
Inquiry  System  System 
Access criteria 
- Written rules  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
- Minimum level of  data or ratios  - - - - - +  + 
representative of  financial strength 
- Minimum number of  transactions  - - - - - - -
- Payment of  an entry fee  +  - - - - - -
- Approval from the owner/manager  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
or the direct participants 
- Approval from the local central bank  +(I)  +(I)  +(I)  +(I)  +(I)  +(1)  +(I) 
- Technical requirements  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
1.  The owner/manager is the central bank. 
2.  Not legally binding. 
3.  Minimum capital of ECU 5 million. 
Table 2.8 
Access criteria in EU large -value net settlement systems6 
B  D  GR  E  F  IE  I  L  NL  PG  UK 
CH  EAF  ACO  M.  Stmd Sagit- DIS  SIPS  Manual  8007  Trad.  CHAPS 
CH  taire  ME,LC Netting  Swift  CH 
Access criteria 
- Written rules  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
- Minimum level of  data or ratios  - - - +  +  - - - - - - -
representative of  financial strength 
- Minimum number of  transactions  - +  - - - - - - - - - + 
- Payment of  an entry fee  +  - - - - +  - - - - - + 
- Approval from the owner/manager  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  - +  - + 
or the direct participants 
- Approval from the local central bank  +  +(1)  +(1)  +  +(I)  +(1)  +  +(1)  +(1)  +(I)  +  + 
- Technical requirements  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
Legenda:  + = Yes  - = No 
(1)  The owner/manager is the central bank. 
6  DIS (Ireland) and  STMD (Spain) are end-of-day gross settlement systems. - 9-
15.  Financial  ratios  and  number  of transactions.  In  some  countries,  compliance  with  the  capital 
requirements set out in the Basle Capital Accord is  expressly mentioned or is being introduced as a 
requirement for application to domestic IFTS. No other financial  data or ratios seem to be used· as 
access criteria.? Some countries are considering the possibility of introducing access criteria to RTGS 
systems based on the number of  payments exchanged via the system. 
16.  Technical  requirements  Even  though  they  are  not  expressly  mentioned  in  principle  3,  technical 
requirements, such as connection to the domestic telecommunication network or to SWIFT or the use of 
specified hardware or software (e.g. for encryption purposes) are mandatory in almost all countries. 
17.  Removal rules In all EU countries it is assumed (or expressly prescribed) that participants are removed 
from  the  system whenever  they  stop  meeting  the  access  criteria.  Specific  rules  or procedures  for 
removing a participant from an IFTS exist only in Belgium and Germany. 
18.  Principle 4: Real-time gross settlement systems. As  soon as feasible, every Member State should 
have a real-time gross settlement system into which as many as large-value payments as possible 
should be channelled. Such systems  should settle across accounts at the central bank and have 
sound legal, technical and prudential features which are compatible across EC Member States. 
19.  Compliance with the principle. When the November 1993 Report was published RTGS systems were in 
operation in only four of  the Member States, Denmark, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, and, except 
in Denmark,  they processed only  a  minority of large-value payments.  By the end  of 1996  RTGS 
systems  are expected to be in operation in all the  EU countries  with the exception of Austria and 
Luxembourg, which will have RTGS systems operating at a later date. 
Central banks are collaborating with domestic banking communities to implement these systems, which 
are intended to form the basic infrastructures of the new payment arrangements to be put in place in 
view of  Stage III of  EMU. In this connection, in November 1994 the EMI published a note entitled "The 
EMI'  s intentions with regard to cross-border payments in Stage III". 
More precisely, the current situation is the following: 
7 
in Denmark,  Sweden  and  Finland,  RTGS  systems  are  already in operation and  no  significant 
modifications are envisaged; 
in Germany, a new ElL system will be implemented in several step from 1995 on using a new data-
processing infrastructures; 
in Italy and the Netherlands, the existing RTGS systems will be completely redesigned; 
in the United Kingdom,  the most important large-value net settlement system,  CHAPS,  will be 
transformed into an RTGS system; 
in Belgium (Clearing House) and Greece  (ACO) the large-value net settlement systems will be 
replaced by R  TGS systems; 
The ECU Banking Association is currently considering whether to introduce public credit ratings as a criterion for 
access to the ECU Clearing and Settlement System. - 10-
in  Spain  and  Ireland,  the  end-of-day  gross-settlement  systems  will  be  converted  into  RTGS 
systems; 
in all other countries, new RTGS systems will be implemented. 
20.  Payments processed In Belgium,  Denmark,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy, the Netherlands,  Portugal,  Sweden 
and the United Kingdom it is intended to process all large-value payments through RTGS systems. In 
the other countries,  some  large-value payments will continue to be processed and settled through net 
settlement systems. 
21.  Principle 5:  Large-value net settlement systems.  Provided that they  settle at the central bank, 
large-value net settlement systems may continue to operate in parallel to real-time gross settlement 
systems  but, in the near future, they should:  (a) settle on the same-day as the exchange of the 
payment instruments: and (b) meet the Lamfalussy standards in full. 
22.  Compliance  with the  principle.  At the  moment,  only the new  netting  system  in  Luxembourg  fully 
complies with principle 5.  The system will provide for immediate payment irrevocability and finality 
and fully collateralised multilateral net limits. 
In some EU countries large-value netting systems (Belgium (Clearing House), Greece (ACO), Portugal 
(Clearing House) and United Kingdom (CHAPS)), are scheduled to disappear. In France, a new system 
complying with the Lamfalussy standards is being studied; it could operate in parallel with TBF, the 
new RTGS system.  In other countries (Germany, Italy, Spain and Finland) new risk control measures 
are being adopted to improve their systems' compliance with the Lamfalussy standards. In particular, in 
Germany, a new system, EAF 2, will be introduced in 1995; it is intended to fully comply with and even 
exceed the minimum standards laid down in the  1990 Re.port of the Committee on Interbank Netting 
Schemes of  the central banks of the Group of Ten countries.  The measures introduced will enable the 
system to reduce credit risk by reducing to a large extent the settlement lag which exists in traditional 
(end-of-day) net settlement systems. 
23.  Principle 6:  Other interbank funds  transfer systems. As  a part of their oversight function,  EC 
central banks should assess the scale and the nature of the settlement risk in  all interbank funds 
transfer systems operating in their country. While seeking to reduce as far as possible the risks in 
these systems, EC central banks may  adopt, for systems  not covered by principles 4  and 5,  a 
somewhat flexible  approach which  takes  into  account the  costs  and benefits  of any envisaged 
solution. Over time, whenever systems are changed or redesigned, increasingly high standards of 
risk-reduction should be achieved. 
24.  Compliance with the principle. As a rule, the scale and nature of the settlement risk in other domestic 
IFTS do not present particular problems for EU central banks. However, some of them  feel that they 
have not yet sufficiently investigated the "safety" standards applied in these systems, to be confident 
that they are appropriate in all cases. - 11-
25.  Measures planned. In most countries no new measures have been introduced. The only exceptions are 
Belgium and  France. When the Belgian RTGS  system will be operational,  a  maximum amount for 
transfers that may be handled will be introduced for the CEC, which, therefore, will only handle retail 
operations. In France some risk control measures are currently under study in the SIT (a retail IFTS) 
and could be implemented in the coming years:  (i) bilateral settlement through the RTGS system; and 
(ii) establishment of  one or more intermediate accounting balances during the course of  the day. 
26.  Principle  7:  Legal  issues.  The legal  basis  of domestic  payment  systems  should  be sound  and 
enforceable.  Inconsistencies  between domestic  legal  systems  in  the EC which increase risks  in 
payment systems need to be analysed and,  as  far as  possible,  reduced.  As  a  first step, where 
necessary, EC central banks should press for changes to certain aspects of national bankruptcy 
laws (e.g. "zero-hour clauses"). 
27.  Zero-hour clauses. In November 1993 the zero-hour rule was still operating in France, Greece, Italy, 
Austria and the Netherlands.  It has been eliminated in France under the law of 31st December 1993, 
which contains  an exemption to the  zero-hour  rule  for  payments  made through interbank payment 
systems.  The  law also  defines  the notion of an interbank payment system in such a  way that the 
exemption will  only apply to financial  institutions.  In the  other  four  countries,  amendments  to the 
existing legislation are being studied in order to abolish the zero-hour rule,  at least as far as banks 
participating in IFTS are concerned. 
28.  Other legal changes.  Other legal changes may be required to enable the smooth functioning of RTGS 
systems. Further work could be required in the following areas: cross-border use of  collateral; finality of 
payments and settlement; legal status of  electronic payments. 
29.  The European Commission. After the discussions held in  1991-92 in the Payment System Technical 
Development Group, the European Commission concluded that a certain degree of  legal harmonisation 
may be necessary to  facilitate  cross-border payments,  and in particular to reduce  risks  and clarify 
responsibilities. A working group of legal experts was established consisting of lawyers from various 
ministries (e.g. Justice, Finance) and lawyers from EU central banks. The Commission is now assessing 
the possibility of  preparing an EU Directive covering areas in which legal harmonisation is desirable. 
30.  Principle  8:  Technical  issues.  Compatible  banking  standards  and  efficient  channels  of 
communication between EC payment systems are desirable and will assist the processing of cross-
border payments in the context of the Single Market. They will become increasingly important in 
view  of EMU. EC central banks will  support and participate in the efforts made by banking 
communities in these fields. 
31.  Standards. In the November 1993 Report it was stated that, although standardisation was important in 
view of  the Single Market, EU central banks were content to leave this matter to the private sector. The - 12-
EMI was invited to participate, as an observer, in the meetings of  the European Committee for Banking 
Standards (ECBS). In the course of 1994, the ECBS approved a standard for cross-border payments. 
This  standard  defines  the  data elements  to be  used  for  cross-border  retail  payments.  It has  been 
considered  as  a  guideline  for  the  future,  but no  time  scale  for  full  compliance  with  it has  been 
established.  This  generic  standard  is  independent  of the  underlying  mechanisms  used  for  payment 
transfers and compatible with most of  the standards adopted in the EU systems. However, the adoption 
of this generic standard raises  several problems.  First of all,  the banking  systems of some  Member 
States do  not conform to all its clauses.  Second,  it is too "generic" and very far from the precision 
generally adopted at the domestic level. Finally, it applies only to credit transfers and cannot be used for 
other payments, in particular, direct debits. 
EU central banks and the EMI share the view that standardisation is  essential for the transition to 
Monetary Union and that,  in Stage  III  of EMU,  more precise  common  standards  will  be required. 
Therefore, the ECBS will be encouraged to go beyond the generic standard and move towards more 
specific ones. In doing so, the proliferation of  non-compatible standards could also be avoided. 
32.  Infrastructures. In  the November 1993 Report, the importance of  compatible infrastructures to facilitate 
cross-border payments was stressed. Work on these issues is in progress, both at the retail and at the 
large-value payments level. 
33.  At the retail level, the EMI and EU central banks are aware of  new payment channels being studied by 
the  banking  communities.  So  far,  four  possible  solutions  have  been  identified:  (i)  acquisition  or 
establishment of banks  - technically interconnected  - throughout the  EU:  (ii)  bilateral relationships 
between major banks; (iii) development of  cross-border intra-group netting and settlement arrangements; 
(iv) linkages  between Automated Clearing Houses. 
So far,  no assessment of these initiatives  has  been carried out by the  EMI,  although,  according to 
Article 109f (3) of  the Treaty on European Union, it is a statutory duty, in view of Stage III of EMU, 
for the EMI "to promote the efficiency of cross-border payments".  The EMI and EU central banks 
intend to gather information in this field in 1995. 
34.  As far as large-value payments are concerned,  EU central banks and the EMI have the intention of 
setting up a  system for  Stage III by linking  the  domestic  RTGS  facilities.  The  European banking 
communities are being consulted on the EMI'  s proposal in this field and a note on the "EMI'  s intentions 
with regards to cross-border payments in Stage III" was released to them in November 1994. 
35.  Principle 9:  Pricing policies  of EC central banks.  The pricing policies  of EC central banks, in 
respect of payment systems functions, should aim  at the avoidance of any competitive distortion 
within the context of the Single Market and in preparation for EMU. As a general principle, such 
policies should aim at the full recovery by the central banks of the costs of these services. 
36.  Compliance with the principle. At the moment only three central banks, recover the full  cost of their 
payment services,  other central banks are actively studying their pricing policies in the light of this - 13-
principle.  A  gradual move  towards  full  cost  recovery  is  emerging  mostly  on the  occasion  of the 
conversion of  existing systems into RTGS or of  the creation of  new RTGS systems. 
37.  Cost methodology.  The full  recovery by central banks of the costs of the payment systems  services 
provided is not sufficient to avoid competitive distortions in the context of  the Single Market and in the 
perspective of the Monetary Union if  the full cost is calculated following different criteria throughout 
the  European Union.  At present,  accounting  systems  differ  from  country to country.  Therefore  EU 
central banks have agreed that a study should be undertaken to establish compatible cost methodologies. 
38.  Principle 10: Operating Hours. The overlap between operating hours of the major EC interbank 
funds transfer systems (and in particular of the hours of RTGS systems) is necessary and could be 
increased in order to facilitate cross-border payments and delivery-versus-payment mechanisms. 
In this respect, and as a preparatory step towards EMU, EC central banks should consider closer 
co-ordination of  the operating hours of  their settlement services. 
39.  Compliance with the principle. The principle is substantially met. Looking at the operating hours of  the 
major EU large-value IFTS, it may be noted that at the present there are three hours (from 9.30 a.m. to 
1.00 p.m. Central European Time) of overlap throughout the European Union, during which time there 
is at least one large-value IFTS per country open (see Table 3). 
The Deutsche Bundesbank decided to extend the operating hours of  the EIL-ZV. It is envisaged for the 
end of 1995  that it will be possible to enter transactions into the  system from  8.30  a.m.  to 3 p.m. 
(Central European Time).  In the UK,  it was agreed that from January  1995,  in preparation for the 
closure of  the Town Clearing (the large-value paper clearing) at the end of February 1995, the final cut-
offtime for CHAPS has changed from 4.30 p.m. to 4.45 p.m. (Central European Time). Time 
System 
B: Clearin! House 
DK: D.N. System 
D:EAF 
D: EIL-ZV 
E: STMD 
GR:ACO 
F: Sa!ittaire 
F:TBF 
FIN: BOF 
IRL: D.I.S.1 
I: SIPS 
I: B.I.S.S. 
I: El. Memoranda 
NL: FA System2 
NL: 8007 system 
P: Traditional clearine 
UK: CHAPS 
S:RIX 
EUR: ECU Clearing 
1 
2 
* 
**** 
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Table 3: Operating hours of the major EC large-value IFTS 
(Central European Time, for interbank payments. for same-day value) 
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* 
* 
19  20 
I  I 
* -15-
GLOSSARY1 
Automated Clearing House (ACH): an electronic clearing system, in which data on payment orders 
are exchanged by magnetic media,  or via a telecommunication network,  and handled  by a  data 
processing centre. 
Bilateral net settlement system: a netting system in which participants' bilateral or net settlement 
positions are settled between every bilateral combination of  participants. 
Banking  organisation:  a  credit  institution  or  an  organisation  collectively  owned  by  credit 
institutions. 
Caps: a risk management arrangement whereby limits are placed on the positions that participants in 
an interbank funds  transfer system can incur during the business  day;  they may be set by each 
individual participant or by the body governing the transfer system; they can be set in multilateral 
net, bilateral net or in gross terms and can be either a credit cap or a debit cap. Bilateral net credit 
caps,  set  by an  individual  participant,  will  constitute  a  limit  on  the  credit  exposure  that that 
participant will accept vis-a-vis each other participant; in contrast, sender net debit caps may be set 
(by the governing body of  the system based on a particular formula), which limit the aggregate value 
of transfers that an individual participant may send to all  other participants  over and  above  its 
incoming transfers. 
Clearing:  a  set of procedures  whereby  financial  institutions  present  and  exchange  data  and/or 
documents relating to funds or securities transfers to other financial institutions at a single location 
(clearing house). The procedures often also contain a mechanism for the calculation of  participants' 
bilateral and/or multilateral net positions with a view to facilitating the settlement of  their obligations 
on a net or net net basis. 
Correspondent  banking:  an  arrangement  under  which  one  bank  provides  payment  and  other 
services to another bank.  Payments through correspondents  are often executed through reciprocal 
accounts  (so-called nostro and vostro  accounts),  to which standing  credit lines  may be  attached. 
Correspondent 
banking  services  are  primarily provided  across  international  boundaries  but are  also  known  as 
agency relationships in some domestic contexts. 
Credit risk (or exposure): the risk that a counter party will not settle an obligation for full value, 
either when due, or at any time thereafter. 
All  definitions  hereafter  are  taken from  the  Glossary  of the  Report  on  "Minimwn Common  Features  for 
Domestic Payment Systems" unless otherwise specified. -16-
Cross currency settlement risk: risk relating to the settlement of  foreign exchange contracts which 
arises when one of  the counterparties to a contract pays out one currency prior to receiving payment 
of  the other. 
Daylight credit (or intra-day credit): credit extended for a period ofless than one business day; in 
a  credit transfer system with end-of-day final  settlement,  daylight credit is tacitly extended by a 
receiving institution if it accepts and acts on a payment order even though it will not receive final 
funds until the end of  the business day. 
Delivery-versus-payment (DVP):  phrase used to summarise the conditions that must hold if the 
counterparties to a transaction in an exchange-of-value system are not to be exposed to principal risk 
(the risk that one counterparty loses the full value of  the transaction); DVP in its most rigorous form 
implies that both the asset transfer and the related funds transfer are simultaneously irrevocable and 
unconditional for the parties involved. 
Direct participants (access) in IFTS: participants in an IFTS who are responsible to the settlement 
institution (or to all other direct participants) for the settlement of  their own payments, those of  their 
customers, and those of  the indirect participants on whose behalf  they are settling . 
Final settlement: settlement of  the obligations between two parties by irrevocable transfer of credit 
across  their  accounts  at  a  defined  settlement  institution.  Where  such  transfers  are  made  by 
irrevocable credit to accounts on the books of a central bank, the transfer could be described as an 
"ultimate settlement" in the economic sense that it is effected in central bank liabilities. 
Funds transfer system (FTS): a formal arrangement, based on private contract or statute law, with 
multiple membership,  common rules  and standardised arrangements,  for the transmission and the 
settlement of  money obligations arising between the members. 
Indirect access (participants) to IFTS: a form a membership which exists to varying degrees in 
FTS; it gives to institutions some functions and responsibilities of  direct participation without going 
as far as entrusting them with the settlement reasponsibilities reserved to direct participants. 
Interbank funds  transfer  system  (IFTS):  funds  transfer  systems  in  which  most  of (or  all) 
participants are used primarily to process cashless payments which involve the credit institutions. 
Irrevocable transfer: a transfer which cannot be revoked by the transferor. 
Large-value payments, large-value IFTS: payments which:  (1) have an urgent nature: and/or  (2) 
need to be irrevocable in order to ensure final setlement. The four types of  payments related to one or -17-
both these two categories: (a) incoming payments stemming from the central bank operations in the 
interbank  money market;  (b) more generally, payments linked to the functioning of the financial 
market in which trading involves the use of  the same-day  funds  several times a day (e.g.  domesti 
currency side of  foreign exchange transactions, eurocurrency markets, interbank lending operations; 
(c)  high-value  or urgent payments  originated by non-bank customers,  mostly corporate;  and (d) 
payments  representing  settlement  operations  for  netting  schemes  or  "delivery  versus  payments 
mechanisms", for which irrevocability and finality of  settlement is a pre-requisite for risk control. 
Liquidity risk: the risk from a participants failure to settle a debit position at the time due because it 
does not have enough liquid assets; liquidity risk does not imply that a participant is insolvent since 
he might be able to settle the required obligation at some unspecified time thereafter. 
Loss-sharing rule (or loss-sharing agreement): an agreement between participants in a  clearing 
system regarding the allocation of any loss arising when one or more participants fail to fulfil their 
obligations; the arrangement stipulates how the loss will be shared among the parties concerned in 
the event the agreement is activated. 
Multilateral  net  settlement  system  (multilateral  NSS):  a  netting  system  m  which  direct 
participants settle only their net net positions resulting from the clearing process. 
Net settlement system (NSS): see bilateral and multilateral net settlement system. 
Netting (or netting scheme): an agreed offsetting of positions or obligations by trading partners or 
participants in a system. The netting reduces a large number of  individual positions or obligations to 
a smaller number of  positions. Netting may take several forms which have varying degrees of  legal 
enforceability in the event of  default of  one of  the parties. 
Oversight:  Central bank duty, principally intended to promote systemic stability. 
Payment: the satisfaction and discharge of  an obligation by the debtor's irrevocable provision of an 
unconditional claim on a third party acceptable to the creditor (for example bank notes,  deposit 
balance held at a financial institution or at the central bank). 
Payment system:  it consists of a  defined  group of institutions, and of a  set of instruments  and 
procedures, used to ensure the circulation of  money within a geographical area, usually a country. 
Real-time transmission or processing: the transmission or processing of funds  and/or securities 
transfer instructions on an individual basis at the time they are initiated. -18-
Real-time gross-settlement systems (RTGS):  (1)  a funds  transfer system;  (2) in which payment 
orders are processed one by one in real-time; and (3) which provides for the immediate settlement of 
all payments provided that there are enough funds or overdraft facilities on the issuer account with 
the settlement agent. 
Remote access to IFTS: (new definition).  A credit institution has remote access to an IFTS if its 
main office or one of  its branches has direct access to an IFTS located in another country. 
Retail  payments,  retail IFTS:  all kinds  of payments  which are not defined  as  large-ones.  (see 
para.10) 
Settlement: completion of  a payment or the discharge of an obligation between two or more parties. 
Frequently used to refer to the payment or discharge of interbank transactions or a series of prior 
existing transactions. 
Settlement risk: a general term used to designate both credit and liquidity risks in a transfer system, 
i.e.  the risk that a party will  fail  to meet  one  or more  obligations  to its  counterparties  or to  a 
settlement agent or settlement institution. 
Settlement agent: the institution initiating the final  settlement of a  clearing,  on behalf of all the 
participants. 
Systemic risk: the risk that the failure of one participant in an interbank funds transfer system or 
securities settlement system, as in financial markets generally, to meet his required obligations will 
cause other participants or financial firms to be unable to meet their obligations when due. 
Zero-hour clause:  provision in the bankruptcy laws  which retroactively renders transactions of a 
closed institution ineffective after 0. 00 a.m. on the date it is ordered to be closed. -19-
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